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Restorative Justice in the Gilded Age: Shared Principles Underlying Two Movements in Criminal Justice
Ali M. Abid
I. Introduction

A

man accused of a robbery is brought before members of his own community. He is encouraged to
speak on his own behalf, and he freely admits to
the offense. Nevertheless, he asks for mercy, not
because he can point to any
particular defenses as we know
them, but rather he argues that
his desperation leading up
to the act, his deep remorse,
and his willingness to repair
the damage he inflicted to his
victim should negate his guilt.
In determining the man’s
punishment, the community
members are permitted to take
all these factors into account,
scrutinizing his remorse, augmenting his plan for reparation,
and, if they so choose, deciding
against punishment altogether. The impartial mediator presiding
over the proceeding, and the person responsible for bringing the
victim’s case against the offender, are also members of the same
community and are directly accountable to that community for
how they conduct themselves. Under this system, both punishment and crime are rare; the administration of justice is apportioned equally among races and classes; and recidivism is low.
Which criminal justice system is this? It is certainly not
the criminal justice system of the United States. Juries in the
United States are tasked with determining the fact of guilt, not
evaluating how morally deserving a defendant is of punishment.
Juries are not, typically, members of the immediate community
of the defendant, and judges and prosecutors are not politically
accountable to those communities, but rather, to broader voting
populations.1 Trials are rare and the procedure is complex.2
Furthermore, the U.S. system does not produce the same
effects as the hypothetical system described above. The scandal of mass incarceration in the U.S. is, by now, well known.
According to a 2008 study by the Pew Center, one in every
one hundred American adults is behind bars.3 The system’s
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disproportionate impact upon the African American population is similarly notorious, with one of every nine black men
between the ages of twenty and thirty-four in prison or in jail.4
And, despite the nine-fold increase in state and federal prison
populations since the early 1970s, the recidivism rate has
remained intransigent, with well over fifty percent of offenders
re-entering prison within three years of release.5
The informal and communal system outlined above
existed in this country in the
past, and two very different
criminal justice movements
would like to see its revival.
The first is the Restorative
Justice movement, which has
spawned hundreds of victim
and offender mediation programs around the world and
draws its practices from the
peacemaking circles of Native
American tribes.6 The second
movement is the culmination of the work of historians and
legal scholars on the criminal justice system of American cities
during the Gilded Age, a system marked by its local community
control and low crime rate.7 Even though these movements have
developed separately, this Article argues that they share many
principles and may be of great use to one another.
Since the mid-1970s, a majority of states in the U.S.
and dozens of countries around the world have implemented
Restorative Justice mechanisms to reduce rates of recidivism
and revitalize communities plagued by crime.8 Restorative
Justice focuses on reintegrating the offender within the community by making him or her understand the harm caused by the
offense and having him or her directly repair the damage to the
victim.9 The movement characterizes “crime” as, the violation
of one person against another, rather than as an offense against
the state.10 Restorative Justice programs take many forms, such
as, victim-offender mediation, family group counseling, peacemaking circles involving members of the community, and other
methods by which the community, the offender, and the victim
interact.11 By gaining a renewed sense of their community and
the impact of the offense, it is argued that individuals are far
29

less likely to reoffend and that victims’ needs are met more fully
than through the conventional criminal justice system.12
Most Restorative Justice practitioners and theorists draw
the roots of their movement from the justice systems of native
and aboriginal groups throughout the world and from historical
accounts of the justice systems in the West before the eleventh
century.13 They argue that the psychological and communitarian
principles behind Restorative Justice have been ignored in the
West ever since the state takeover of the criminal justice system
in the early feudal era.14 Reviving this system, however, has
presented many problems for Restorative Justice proponents,
including trying to dispel fears that this system may not comport
with individuals’ constitutional protections.15
The second approach to criminal justice that this Article
examines does not have an identifying name. Supporters of
this approach include criminal justice historians, legal scholars,
and political conservatives and liberals alike, who would like
to see a return to the criminal justice mechanisms that existed
in the urban centers of the U.S. during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.16 During this time, known as the
Gilded Age, the cities of the Northeast and Midwest had, by our
standards today, small inmate populations, low levels of crime,
and—perhaps most surprisingly—less discriminatory treatment
of suspect classes.17
To explain this viewpoint, this Article will draw particularly upon the work of William J. Stuntz, the former Henry J.
Friendly professor of law at Harvard University, who argues in
his book, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice, that the
loss of local democratic control over criminal justice mechanisms, coupled with the criminal procedure innovations introduced
by the Warren Court, led to the ‘tough on crime’ political
backlash that has fueled the rise in incarceration.18 During the
Gilded Age, political power over judges, prosecutors, and police
forces came from those very same communities who were most
often faced with criminal punishment, as did the pool of jurors.19
Furthermore, trial procedures were simple, and the legal definition of crimes made them open to the types of defenses and
moral evaluations illustrated in the hypothetical at the beginning
of this Article.20 This, Stuntz and others argue, created a system
that was at once lenient and effective.
Proponents of Restorative Justice and the proponents of
a return to the Gilded Age system use different terminology,
suggest different reforms, and draw their movements from
different origins.21 Yet this Article argues that these movements share key principles, and the forms of criminal justice
they fight for bear strong resemblances to one another. These
shared principles include communitarianism and flexibility in
the administration of justice. Specifically, this Article argues
that the Restorative Justice community does itself a disservice
by describing itself as wholly foreign to the criminal justice
system of the United States. The successful mechanisms used
30

by the justice system of urban centers in the Gilded Age, can
provide new tools for the Restorative Justice movement and
answer many of its critics.
Part II of this Article describes various aspects of the
Restorative Justice movement: the criminological theory of
reintegrative shaming on which many restorative programs
are based; its procedures; and its effect on victims and communities. Part III illustrates the movement’s origins and current
controversies surrounding its implementation. Part IV describes:
the criminal justice system that existed in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries in America, how it came to be, its chief
characteristics—which allowed it to keep down both crime and
prison populations, and how the United States transitioned from
that system to our current system. Part V describes the shared
principles of communitarianism and flexibility in the administration of criminal justice that unites both the Restorative
Justice movement with justice from the Gilded Age, and how
the justice system of the Gilded Age can inform Restorative
Justice and respond to its critics.

II. Restorative Justice:
Principles, Mechanisms, and Claims
A. The Concept of Shame: Its Lighter
and Darker Sides
There was a time in the West when public shaming was
a prominent part of criminal punishment. Chain gangs, public
floggings, and pillorying were once common forms of public
humiliation for the convicted.22 Generally, the “uncoupling of
shame and punishment” was celebrated, but Restorative Justice
theorists seek to reclaim the idea of shame and stress its importance as part of crime control.23 Restorative Justice supporters
distinguish, however, between destructive, stigmatizing shaming,
and redemptive, reintegrating shaming. 24 The conventional
criminal justice system, they argue, stigmatizes offenders,
which prevents them from ever re-entering legitimate society,
and pushes them into criminal subcultures.25 Reintegrative
shaming, as produced through Restorative Justice techniques,
forces the offender to experience shame and remorse over their
criminal act, but then allows them to re-enter legitimate society
with their dignity restored.26

1. Stigma in the Conventional Criminal Justice System
Proponents of Restorative Justice argue that the conventional criminal justice system focuses too much on assigning
blame and inflicting punishment.27 This has the effect of stigmatizing the offender in a way that prevents his reintegration
with legitimate society, while at the same time insulating the
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offender from the harm he caused to the victim and his own
potential feelings of remorse.28
John Braithwaite, who first formulated the criminological
theory of reintegrative shaming, describes the stigmatizing
effect of prison as follows:
Prisons are schools for crime; offenders learn new
skills for the illegitimate labor market in prison and become more deeply enmeshed in criminal subcultures.
Prison can be an embittering experience that leaves
offenders more angry at the
world than when they went
in. The interruption to a career
in the legitimate labor market
and the stigma of being an
ex-con can reduce prospects
of legitimate work on completion of the sentence.29

are the subject of bargaining and are exchanged for lesser or
greater charges depending on the offender’s willingness to comply.36 These procedures are at odds with how offenders view
their actions (not as individual decisions, but as guided by their
environment) and that disconnect allows them to adopt exculpatory psychological strategies to insulate themselves from the
immense stigma the system is attempting to put on them.37
John Braithwaite summarizes the five major exculpatory
strategies as follows: “denial of victim (‘We weren’t hurting
anyone’); denial of injury (‘They
can afford it’); condemnation of
condemners (‘They’re crooks
themselves’); denial of responsibility (‘I was drunk’); and appeal
to higher authorities (‘I had to
stick by my mates’).”38 Because
the system focuses on their guilt
to such a large extent, and because
the stigmatic costs are so high,
offenders also focus on what they
see as their persecution and on the
mitigating factors of their crime.39
What offenders do not focus on—
and what is not encouraged by the
conventional system—is accepting
responsibility for their crimes, the
effect of the crimes on their victims, and how the offender might
make reparation and re-enter
legitimate society. Reintegrative
shaming, it is argued, brings these
more helpful concerns to the fore.40

The goal is then not to

shame so permanently that
offenders start drawing

their conceptions of right

Once an ex-felon experiences
this sort of rejection he or she may
seek out criminal subcultures that
“reject their rejectors.”30 Criminal
activity becomes an easier way
for them to earn a living and
criminal subcultures become the
only communities from which
they draw respect.31
In some communities, particularly those facing a disproportionate amount of criminal
punishment, criminal subcultures
are more pronounced and can be
more attractive to some than law-abiding communities.32 In an
interview, Howard Zehr, another prominent Restorative Justice
scholar, relates a conversation about shame and respect he
had with a prisoner serving a life sentence without parole in a
Pennsylvania prison:

and wrong from criminal

subcultures, but to shame
enough so that they are

brought back into conformity
with the legitimate society.

I said, ‘When you were growing up in North Philly,
what gave you shame and what gave you respect?’
And he said, ‘Well, what gave me respect is what
you would think should give me shame.’ He said, …
‘I remember my first arrest. I rode through my community in the back of that police car, and it was the
proudest moment of my life. I had become a man.’33
This inversion of values and sources of esteem is the
product of stigma and is encouraged by the procedures of the
conventional criminal justice system.34 Plea-bargaining and
criminal trials, in the conventional system, are focused on
assigning an individualistic version of blame.35 The crimes are
also presented in abstract and archaic ways, multiple charges
Criminal Law Brief

2. Reintegrative Shaming
Shame, many proponents of Restorative Justice argue, is
a necessary and good component of society and reflects our
communal, rather than individual, nature.41 Shame reminds us
of the “deep mutual involvement we have with one another.”42
These interdependencies do not limit our independence, but are
in fact necessary for freedom.43 John Braithwaite theorizes that
we can shame without stigmatizing, and that shame is a necessary part of crime control.44 This theory is based on the insight
that the “individuals who resort to crime are those insulated
from shame over their wrongdoing.”45 The goal is then not to
shame so permanently that offenders start drawing their conceptions of right and wrong from criminal subcultures, but to shame
enough so that they are brought back into conformity with the
legitimate society. For these reasons, reintegrative shaming has
two chief characteristics that distinguish it from stigmatizing
shaming: (1) finite, rather than indefinite, duration; and (2) efforts to maintain the bonds of respect throughout the process.46
31

The following section examines how this principle is
implemented.

B. The Methods of Restorative Justice
and its Outcomes
1. Encounters Between the Stakeholders
Restorative Justice programs take many forms, including
victim-offender mediation and reconciliation programs
(VORPS), family group conferencing, peacemaking circles,
and more.47 What they all have in common is that they feature a
facilitated conversation between the primary stakeholders in the
conflict (the victim, the offender, and representatives of their
community or communities) about the impact of the offense
and what can be done to restore the parties to their previous
positions.48 In these encounters, the parties are encouraged
to speak for themselves rather than through lawyers.49
The relevant community to be included varies depending
on the nature of the offense.50 The role of the community
here is to express shame regarding the offender’s actions,
while at the same time displaying respect and openness to the
offender as a person.51 The community members also prevent the
offender—due to their deep knowledge of him or her—from
adopting the exculpatory psychological strategies that insulate
one from feelings of remorse. Stated alternatively, they know
the offender well enough to detect when he or she is making
excuses or being dishonest.52 For certain smaller offenses, only
the families of the victims and offender may be necessary.53 For
crimes that affect larger sections of the population, the community members involved in the proceeding should be drawn
from the neighborhood or several neighborhoods that were
hurt by the offender’s actions.54
The third party mediator is tasked with facilitating the
conversation between the primary stakeholders to make sure
that everyone’s needs are met, and to prevent the conversation
from taking harmful routes towards stigmatization on the part
of the community or exculpatory strategies on the part of the
offender.55 The final plan for reparation developed by the assembled parties need not represent the optimal solution to the
third party facilitator, but must only be mutually beneficial to
the group developing it.56 The reparation plans (or sentences)
need not be based on precedent; rather, flexibility and “democratic creativity” is encouraged.57 In fact, the reparation plans
must be flexible to both reflect the harms done to the particular
victim and the requisite steps for the particular offender to
re-enter legitimate society.58
Restorative Justice programs distinguish themselves from
conventional trials in a number of ways. The conventional trial
is formal and meets in a courthouse, the language used during
the process is technical, emotions are minimized, and victims
and offenders certainly do not engage in direct communication.59
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Conversely, Restorative Justice programs are informal (often
meeting in community centers), use layspeak (describing the
acts in terms that relate to the experience of the parties), center
the process on the expression of emotion, and encourage direct
verbal communication between the parties.60

2. Three Stages: Awareness, Shame and Censure,
Redemption and Restoration
The goal of Restorative Justice programs are to move the
primary stakeholders through three phases: (1) awareness of harm;
(2) shame and censure; and (3) restoration and redemption.61
First, the offender must become aware of the full impact
of his crime on the victim and the community.62 As mentioned
earlier, the conventional criminal justice system allows the
offender to adopt certain neutralizing, exculpatory techniques, but, in Restorative Justice conferences, the offender is
confronted directly with the words of the victim and of the
community.63 The excuses that the offender might resort to in
a conventional trial — that the victim deserved it, could afford
it, and so on — are challenged.
Second, the community and victim are allowed to express
anger and frustration at the actions of the offender.64 However,
the community must maintain that they are condemning the
actions of the offender and not the offender himself.65 The
offender then has a chance to feel remorse and express disapproval of what he had done. This gives the offender the
opportunity to separate what he sees as his true self from the
crime he committed.
Third, the offender is encouraged to help devise and carry
out a plan of reparation to restore the victim to his status before
the crime.66 Once this is agreed to, the victim and the community may offer to forgive the offender right then or after the
reparation is complete.67 At some point, the offender is officially welcomed back into the community in what is commonly
known as a decertification ceremony.68 This gesture completes
the Restorative Justice program and announces the restoration
of not just the victim’s status but also the offender’s status
before the crime.

i. Outcomes: Effect on Recidivism
One of the major claims of the Restorative Justice movement is that these processes will lower the chance that the
offenders will offend again. A recent meta-analysis of every
major Restorative Justice program for juveniles, consisting of a sample size of over 11,000 offenders, found that the
programs reduced the recidivism rate by twenty-four percent.69
Furthermore, of those participants who did reoffend, the
programs reduced both the frequency and seriousness of subsequent offenses.70 Major studies have found recidivism rates
reduced from anywhere between sixteen percent and thirty-three
percent following completion of Restorative Justice programs.71
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In fact, all studies that have examined participants’ offense rates
before and after restorative sessions found an overall reduction
in criminal activity after these sessions.72
Multivariate analyses have pointed out certain key factors
within Restorative Justice programs that correlate strongly with
reduced reoffending.73 These factors touch upon the offender’s
experience and include: having a memorable Restorative Justice
conference, not feeling like an outsider, agreeing with the
outcome and the methods, and meeting the victim and apologizing to him or her, or to the family of the victim.74
The dramatic effect that Restorative Justice has on recidivism is not merely due to the self-selection of the offenders who
choose to participate. Studies have been performed wherein the
offenders subjected to restorative programs have been selected
randomly, and the recidivism rates have still decreased.75 In a
Canadian study, the town of Sparwood, British Columbia subjected all of its juvenile offenders to Restorative Justice programs
as opposed to the traditional court system for three years and, by
the second year of the experiment, the recidivism rate had plummeted by sixty-seven percent from the pre-experiment average.76

C.	Outcomes: Effect on Victims
and Communities
1. Victims
Despite the subject of the above parts, Restorative Justice
proponents are quick to point out that it focuses on the needs
of the victims and communities far more than the conventional
criminal justice system, which proponents accuse of being too
offender-focused.77 Indeed, unlike the conventional criminal
justice system, Restorative Justice characterizes crimes as a
violation of one person by another, rather than as an abstract
offense against the state.78 Victims are not given a special place
in the conventional criminal trial, but are placed on the same
level as any witness to the crime, where, despite the efforts of
the victims’ reform movement, many of their most crucial needs
are not met.79
Howard Zehr posits that there are three phases in a victim’s
reaction to crime: impact, recoil, and — for those who go
through something akin to Restorative Justice — recovery.80
Impact is the initial feeling of trauma following the crime, and
recoil consists of the shattering of the perception that the world
is an orderly, meaningful place where our personal autonomy
is respected.81 Recovery can come through the voluntary
compensation by the offender to the victim.82 Compensation,
symbolic or otherwise, that the offender makes to the victim
through the Restorative Justice process conveys to the victim
that the offender realizes what he did was wrong and it restores
those lost conceptions of the recoil phase.83 The Restorative
Justice program makes victims feel empowered, allowing them
to speak and assert their self-worth, providing security through
Criminal Law Brief

community involvement, and reassuring them that something
is being done about the damage inflicted upon them.84
Some who defend the conventional criminal justice system
say that by having the state punish the offender, the state is in
essence showing solidarity with the victim and thus, responding
to their needs.85 Restorative Justice proponents respond by saying
that the conventional system deprives victims of compensation because imprisoned offenders are often not able to get
jobs and pay back their victim from judgments following civil
suits, and many victims are too poor to litigate civil remedies.86
Additionally, with high punitive sanctions, offenders will do
much more to avoid punishment, shying away from acts of apology or reparation that they may have otherwise done.87 In other
words, the offender remains a combatant against the victim and,
in so doing, further victimizes them.

2. Communities
Restorative Justice’s effect on communities reflects its
transformative potential. Nils Christie, a prominent Restorative
Justice scholar, has suggested that Restorative Justice programs
should not presuppose that conflicts ought to be solved.88
Rather, conflicts are valuable commodities and it may be more
important that communities come together and participate in the
discussion of conflicts, perhaps even living with them, rather
than assuming that one side must change.89 Although most
Restorative Justice practitioners and scholars do not go as far as
Christie, nearly all see conflicts as opportunities for empowering
the community and changing it for the better.90
This transformative aim comes from the recognition
that many current communities do not have the strong set of
interdependencies and communitarian relationships that make
Restorative Justice effective.91 In many instances, victims
and offenders do not feel as though they belong to the same
community at all. By using Restorative Justice mechanisms,
however, those relationships might be created for the first time.
Empowerment of the community, according to the work of Bush
and Folger, comes about when the community members experience “a strengthened awareness of their own self-worth and
their own ability to deal with whatever difficulties they face.”92
This goal is another reason why the third party facilitators must
not project their views of what the best solution might be onto
the parties, but rather let the parties come to their own solutions.
For many, the concept of community is defined by the ability
of groups to handle conflicts. David Cayley summarizes Nil
Christie’s views on community as follows:
Community, he says, is made from conflict as much
as from cooperation; the capacity to resolve conflict is
what gives social relations their sinew. Professionalizing
justice ‘steals the conflicts’, robbing the community of its
ability face trouble and restore peace. Communities lose
33

the confidence, their capacity, and finally their inclin
ation to preserve their own order. They become instead
consumers of police and court ‘services,’ with the consequence that they largely cease to be communities.93
To Bush and Folger, and most Restorative Justice scholars,
the effects of mediation reach far beyond the particular people
involved. Rather, these programs reflect a choice between an
individual worldview and what they term as a “relational worldview.”94 In the individual worldview the focus is on meeting an
individual’s wants and desires, but, in a relational one, the goal
is transformation that integrates the individual’s strength with
compassion toward others.95
Unfortunately, getting grassroots community involvement
has posed a challenge for Restorative Justice practitioners. Aside
from the aboriginal and tribal councils that began the modern
Restorative Justice movement, getting communities from large
urban centers involved has been quite difficult.96 Some, like
Tony Marshall, have suggested that these communities lack
the considerable infrastructure, time, money, and sense of
community to effectively run involved victim-offender mediations.97 These theorists suggest that smaller, simpler programs
be introduced at first to build up communitarian feeling before
larger programs can take hold.98 Although these and other difficulties are addressed more thoroughly in Part III(B), on current
controversies and challenges to the movement, it is important
to note here that many scholars attribute these difficulties to
the conventional criminal justice system’s effect on modern
communities, and the vastly different origins of the Restorative
Justice movement.99

III. Restorative Justice:
Origins and Controversies
A.	Origins
Most Restorative Justice scholars claim Restorative Justice
practices reflect the justice systems in the pre-modern West
and in the justice systems of native and aboriginal groups
throughout the world.100 Western countries, including Great
Britain, abandoned this system of justice in the eleventh century
when state powers started to monopolize the administration of
criminal justice and the use of force.101 By the mid-nineteenth
century, European colonial powers had made their system of
criminal justice ubiquitous throughout the world, replacing their
conquered territories’ restorative systems with their preferred
method of criminal justice.102 Many of the indigenous groups
in these areas, however, held onto these restorative systems
and practiced them without official state sanction. Starting in
the mid-1960s these groups started to reassert the legitimacy
34

of their systems.103 The Maori people of New Zealand and
native Canadian tribes first gained national statutory support
for peacemaking circles in their countries in the mid-1980s.104
Since then, these systems have expanded to non-native groups
and have gained acceptance throughout Europe, Southeast Asia,
and in the statutory schemes of thirty U.S. states.105
The Restorative Justice proponents’ history of criminal
justice represents a marked difference from the traditional,
linear story of the advancement and humanitarian evolution of
criminal justice.106 The conventional image of “penal progress,”
as described by Gerry Johnstone, starts with the assumption that
pre-modern societies were lawless.107 “Justice” largely consisted
of one party getting vengeance upon the other and this commonly led to unending vendettas between families or clans.108
Slowly this system was replaced with another based on money
and trade where the offender could buy off vengeance against
him.109 The offender would pay bot, or betterment, to his victim
and wite, a fine of sorts, to the king or local feudal lord.110 As the
central state power grew, fines were systemized and expanded.
The central power took to demanding fines of those who committed negligent or accidental wrongs and physically punishing
those who committed intentional or malicious wrongs.111
Restorative Justice scholars, however, suggest that systems
of reparation and the use of conferences were in place long
before the government-imposed system of fines came about.112
Vendettas and revenge were the exceptions to the rule and only
happened where restorative processes were weak.113 For modern
day examples, Restorative Justice scholars point to practices
from societies that never developed in the Western system, such
as Navajo peacemaking circles and the Wagga model based on
the system of the Maori.114 These societies define crime in the
same way as Restorative Justice practitioners, as a violation of
one person by another.115 The Navajo process consists of members of
the community, the victim, and the offender all coming together
to have a conversation about the act, facilitated by a respected
member of the community.116 The offender is encouraged to
arrive at a reparation plan voluntarily.117
Restorative Justice proponents claim that the ubiquity of
the conventional system may have blinded us to better systems,
and also to what was lost when we transitioned from restorative
societies to our current society.118 Specifically, proponents suggest
that with state takeover of the criminal process, victims became
neglected, shaming went from reintegrative to stigmatizing, and
the process became far more costly.119
Many Restorative Justice scholars do not accept the
pre-modern and indigenous origin story. Kathleen Daly, for
one, dismisses it as a creation myth that is destructive in that
it romanticizes and, in a way recolonizes, the past and indigenous groups throughout the world.120 Others, like Gerry
Johnstone, question the utility of the connection, wondering if
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these pre-modern systems could or should be revived within
the context of modern communities and criminal law.121

that would be capable of exercising enough control over them
to carry out Restorative Justice processes.127

B.	Controversies

2. Is Shaming Oppressive? Is it in Accordance
with Human Rights?

1. Are Modern Communities Capable of Restorative
Justice?
It is generally acknowledged that we have moved from
societies of communal relations to ones of non-communal
relations due to industrialization, urbanization, and the rise of
technology.122 Modern citizens have less interaction with and
less knowledge of their direct neighbors.123 Can such weakened
modern communities shame offenders and bring them back
into the fold? John Braithwaite, the founder of the reintegrative
shaming framework, says this is possible if we change what we
consider a community.124 Instead
of geographic units, modern communities are collections of people
with shared interests. Braithwaite
describes this as follows:

Some commentators have expressed concern over
encouraging communities to become so deeply involved with
the criminal justice system by shaming those who violate
the community’s rules.128 James Whitman, for one, fears that
stirring up community indignation will result in communities acting irrationally and oppressively enforcing their own
mores.129 David Cayley fears that the effect may be to weaken
already weak parties in the communities.130 He notes that communities are not often egalitarian or homogenous; there are some
in the community who carry more or less power, and maintain
more or less socially desirable
positions within the community.131
Depending on an offender’s place
in the social hierarchy, they may
receive more or less leniency at the
hands of a Restorative Justice conference, while the victims of these
offenders may receive more or less
justice depending on the offenders
place in the community.132
Johnstone noticed the manifestation of some of these issues
in his study of victim offender
mediations.133 When this occurs,
the conferences unravel, resulting
in degradation ceremonies rather
than Restorative Justice.134 This
fear is magnified when one considers that procedural protections for
the offender are far more relaxed in
these programs as compared with a
conventional criminal trial.135
Restorative Justice proponents
defend the relaxed procedural
protections and heightened community involvement by pointing
to the underlying principles and how they differ from the
principles underlying the conventional criminal justice
system. They argue that as restoration and reparation, not
punishment, are the results of these processes, procedural and
constitutional protections are less necessary.136 Communities
that actually know and care about the reintegration of the
offender and justice for the victim are far less likely to be volatile or capricious than the highly punitive conventional criminal
justice system.137 Again, this debate continues.

[M]ost Restorative Justice

The contemporary city-dweller
may have a set of colleagues
at work, in her trade union,
among members of his golf
club, among drinking associates whom he meets at the
same pub, among members
of a professional association, the parents and citizens’
committee for her daughter’s school, not to mention
a geographically, extended
family, where many of these
significant others can mobilize
potent disapproval. There are
actually more interdependencies in the nineteenth- and
twentieth-century city; it is just
that they are not geographically segregated within a
community.125

theorists believe that there
must be balance between

the “democratic creativity”
of Restorative Justice

mechanisms and oversight by
the state, in order to protect

minority groups and human
rights, but where that

balance is to be struck is still
a matter of great debate.

Johnstone points out that these communities are not
necessarily strong enough to exert the kind of influence necessary for Restorative Justice, causing individuals to withdraw
from these communities at will without suffering any shame
or harm.126 Furthermore, extending the definition of communities broadly, risks including the criminal subcultures that
would not shame an individual for engaging in criminal activity. Braithwaite responds to these criticisms by claiming that
for nearly all individuals there are some people in their lives
Criminal Law Brief
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3. Does Community Control Undermine the Rule
Of Law?
What if an offender is charged by the state for violating
a law that the community disagrees with? Under a pure
Restorative Justice system, where the community, offender,
and victim arrive at a reparation plan together, they may elect
not to punish the offender at all.138 Would this not undermine
the rule of law? Could Restorative Justice deal with ‘victimless’
crimes? John Braithwaite embraces this uncertainty by saying
that Restorative Justice might serve as a good measurement of
what should and should not be criminalized.139 He feels that
there will always be consensus regarding the criminality of
certain acts, such as assault, murder, rape, robbery, etc., so there
is little risk of Restorative Justice leading to a dangerous level of
lawlessness; and, for other acts, for which there is no consensus
regarding there reprehensibility, communities should feel free
to disregard them.140 Johnstone finds this “seriously misguided,”
as many laws that may be unpopular are necessary for the
protection of minority groups.141
Again, most Restorative Justice theorists believe that
there must be balance between the “democratic creativity” of
Restorative Justice mechanisms and oversight by the state, in
order to protect minority groups and human rights,142 but where
that balance is to be struck is still a matter of great debate.
These controversies center on fears of the unintended
consequences that broad implementation of restorative justice
mechanisms might have within the framework of modern
states.143 However, we find that these principles have been
tested, and to good result, in the U.S. criminal justice system
just a century ago.144

IV. Restorative Justice In the Gilded Age
Between the mid-nineteenth century and the start of World
War I, thirty million Europeans made their way to the U.S. and
settled mostly in the Northern cities and in the industrial belt.145
Following their arrival, there was an uptick in the crime rate
that quickly subsided along with inmate populations.146 In the
first two thirds of the twentieth century, seven million African
Americans made their way from the South to the cities of the
Northeast and Midwest, again there was an uptick in the crime
and incarceration rates, but this one was far more long lasting
and far more severe.147
At first glance, the difference in impact makes little sense,
as the reaction to both migrations was initially similar. Both
migrations caused political backlashes by those already in the
cities, centering on fear that the arriving populations would
cause increases in vice and crime.148 In response to the first
migration of European immigrants, there was a generation of
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legislation dedicated to fighting vices, which resulted in the
18th Amendment among many other pieces of legislation.149
However, within a couple generations, at the height of “Morals
Legislation,” the children of these immigrants were able to gain
political offices and power at every level of government, from
local police chiefs and mayors, to state governors and senators,
and even presidents of the United States.150 The internal migration of African Americans caused a similar backlash. Notably,
in 1986, Congress passed a law, which punished the possession
of one gram of crack cocaine the same as the possession of
one-hundred grams of powder cocaine.151 African Americans
were also able to expand their political influence, though
less comprehensively than the immigrant communities of the
nineteenth century.152
What caused the difference then? Why did the first migration
result in only a modest increase in crime and incarceration,
while the second one resulted in dramatic increases in both?
William J. Stuntz, in his study of these two migrations and how
the U.S. criminal justice system has changed over time, argues
that, although these two groups moved into the same cities and
amidst the same fears, they were migrating into vastly different
criminal justice systems.153 This Article argues that the more
effective criminal justice system of the Gilded Age, to which
the European immigrant population was delivered, was far more
in line with Restorative Justice principles.
This Article will now turn to an examination of the Gilded
Age system in more detail, its crime and incarceration rates,
origins, chief characteristics, and how the U.S. has transitioned
from that system to its current system.

A. Criminal Justice in the Gilded Age
1. Crime and Incarceration Rates were Low
and Stable
Crimes rates in the Northern and Midwestern cities during
the Gilded Age were lower and more stable than today.154 For
example, between 1875 and 1925, the homicide rate in New
York City hovered steadily between a low of two per every
100,000 residents to a high of six per every 100,000 residents.155
Whereas in the period 1950-2000, the lowest rate was four per
every 100,000 residents—occurring in the early 1950s—and
the highest was thirty-one per every 100,000 residents.156 Other
major industrializing cities of the North and Midwest show a
similar pattern of low and stable rates of homicide during the
Gilded Age, and then rapidly rising levels of violent crime
in the second half of the twentieth century until the 1990s. 157
These fluctuations in the homicide rate are representative of the
fluctuations in the rate of crime as a whole.158
The imprisonment rate was similarly stable and low during
the Gilded Age.159 The imprisonment rate in New York City
decreased rather steadily from 1890 to 1925, from 138 to just
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over 50 per every 100,000 residents.160 Between 1950 and 2000,
however, the imprisonment rate dipped from one-hundred in
1950 to just over fifty in 1972, and then rocketed upwards to
four-hundred per every 100,000 residents, its all-time high,
in 1998.161 Again, other major urban centers showed similar
trends.162 It is important to note that as the crime rate decreased
during the Gilded Age, the incarceration rate also decreased.163
However, this Article will demonstrate that in the second half
of the twentieth century the incarceration rate’s increases
and decreases seemed to be unaffected by, and unaffecting of,
fluctuations in the crime rate.164

2. Treatment of Suspect Classes
Members of suspect classes received fairer treatment under
the criminal justice system of the Gilded Age in the North than
one might expect. This is not to say that discrimination was not
rampant at the time; harmful discrimination on the basis of sex,
race, and national origin was not only pervasive, but also legally
sanctioned in ways that are unthinkable now. Yet, within the
criminal justice system, there was a surprising amount of lenity
toward these classes.
For example, take the case of women who murder their
abusive husbands or boyfriends. Many times these killings
occur, not in the midst of an attack by the abusive partner,
but following a plan laid out by the abused partner. In recent
decades, evidence of “battered woman’s syndrome” offers a
small chance of outright acquittal for defendants and represents
a hard won transformation of the self-defense rule in support of
abuse victims.165
One might expect that the chances for women on trial
would have been far worse a century ago, but, in fact, they were
far more successful in receiving acquittals for these acts than
their counterparts are today. As Stuntz puts it:
[i]n the Gilded Age, more than 80 percent of Chicago
women who killed their husbands escaped punishment—among white women, the figure topped 90
percent—thanks to what contemporaries called ‘the
new unwritten law’ granting women broad rights
of self-defense, even when no history of domestic
violence was proved.166
This trend existed, not just in Chicago, but in all the major,
industrializing cities of the time.167
African Americans also received fairer treatment than
might be expected. Studies of nineteenth century Philadelphia
and Chicago have shown that black men fared equally well
as white men when accused of murder.168 In either case, even
where discrimination and disparate impacts were clearly measurable, there was nothing like the massive racial imbalance
that exists in the prison population today. Historians, such as
Lane and Adler suggest that African American defendants fared
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better proportionately than their counterparts today because all
defendants, regardless of race or national origins, fared better
than defendants today.169 “A mere twenty-two percent of turnof-the-century Chicago homicides led to criminal convictions;
Chicago juries were quick to acquit in cases in which the killing
seemed plausibly excusable.”170 Adler in particular notes that
generic self-defense arguments nearly always persuaded jurors
of the era.171
We now turn to how this system came about and its chief
characteristics.

3. Origins
At the time of the founding of the U.S., crime victims
brought charges directly against the alleged criminal, and the
victims, not public prosecutors, decided which crimes merited
prosecution and which did not.172 In that way, criminal law
functioned far more like civil law functions today. Most urban
centers did not have professional police forces, but rather
groups of ordinary citizens taking part as night watchmen.173
Prosecutors received piecework pay and would simply have to
“ratify the choices of constables or crime victims.”174 Substantive
criminal law was the product of judge-made decisions rather
than of legislatures; due to this fact, it reflected more nearly the
conflicts of individuals against other individuals as found in the
Common Law and in Blackstone’s Commentaries, rather than
the public policy decisions of legislatures.175
In the years leading up to the Civil War, in response to the
arriving immigrant populations, many institutional reforms took
place. Prosecutors became publicly elected officials, salaries
replaced piecework pay, and the new politicization rewarded
those prosecutors who punished crimes the public most wanted
them to punish.176 Professional police forces replaced the groups
of watchmen.177 What was once a system overseen by weak state
officials became larger, more democratic, and more controlled
by urban political machines.
The goal of the institutional reforms may have been to
protect the native-born population from young immigrant men,
but the long-term effect was to empower those men. As Stuntz
puts it, “[b]y the [nineteenth] century’s end, most of the cities of
the Northeast and Midwest were ruled by immigrants and their
children.”178 “They dominated local police forces—Irish cops
decided which Irish criminals to arrest.”179

4. Key Traits: Common, Less Procedural Trials; Robust
Criminal Intent Requirements; and Local Control
By the late nineteenth century the institutional reforms in
the Northern cities developed three basic characteristics that
differentiate it from criminal justice today: (1) trials focused
less on procedure and were more common; (2) substantive
criminal law, particularly that of criminal intent, was more
vague and more open to defense arguments; and (3) there was
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local control, meaning the communities where law enforcement
was most active were the ones that had the greatest amount of
political power over the system.180
First, trials were far more common. Today ninety-five
percent of felony convictions are obtained by guilty plea.181 Jury
acquittals are rare; trials as a whole are rare. At the turn of the
last century, however, sixty percent of felony charges ended
in conviction and far fewer defendants plead guilty.182 Stuntz
argues that this difference was due in large part to the lack of
procedural rules and protections that applied during the Gilded
Age.183 Scrutinizing criminal procedures, police practices,
and trial procedure requires lengthy
trials, extensive motion practice, and
expensive trial lawyers, all of which
make trials less common. These ideas
are explored more thoroughly in the
next section. The important matter
here is that the Gilded Age system
was markedly different from our own.
Again, Stuntz puts it best:

How and why the scienter requirement has been minimized
is explored in greater depth in the next part of this Article.
Third, the communities of working-immigrants, the ones
most affected by the administration of criminal justice, were the
ones that had the most power over it. Prosecutors and judges in
the U.S. today are most commonly elected at the county level.189
A century ago, local municipal governments were far more
active than the state and federal governments and, in metropolitan
counties, communities of immigrants and the poor had immense
political clout due to their large populations.190 Powerful urban
political machines developed to elect judges, prosecutors, and
councilmen—these machines thrived
on votes from these communities and
answered to them. Jury pools also
consisted of people from these communities.191 Again, this all changed
in the late twentieth century, when
the suburban populations within
these counties bloomed and assumed
political power over the system and
representation in the jury pool.192
As an aside, The Gilded Age
system of the Northeastern and
Midwestern cities is the focus of
this movement because the Southern
criminal justice system was quite
distinct from it. Throughout the
South, during this time, imprisonment
rates and incarceration rates were
much higher than in the North.193 One
key feature that was missing from
the Southern criminal justice was
local control. African Americans and
poorer Southern whites were the victims of massive disenfranchisement
schemes common during the postReconstruction era; these schemes left
these groups with little control over
the criminal justice system, though
they were its chief targets.194
We now turn to how this system
of justice changed and became the
criminal justice system we have in
the U.S. today.

The concept of scienter,
the “vicious will” that
must accompany all

crimes, was far more

Trials and acquittals alike were
far more common than today .
. . Because acquittals happened
frequently, they were also less
newsworthy than today. So, in
the Gilded Age Northeast, prosecutors paid a smaller political
price for acquittals and were less
eager to avoid them today. Note
the logic: less elaborate trial
procedures helped defendants—
not the government—by making
both trials and acquittals ordinary
events. Prosecutors do not invest
heavily in avoiding outcomes
that seemed ordinary.184

vague then. This

opened up trials to

many types of defense
arguments regarding
the circumstances of
the defendant’s life,

his character, etc.—
arguments that are

Second, criminal intent had a
much larger role to play. Jurors in the
Gilded Age were not limited to determining the weight to be given various
pieces of evidence—they were not
merely the “lie detectors” that they
have since become.185 Rather, when
deciding upon the existence of scienter, criminal intent, they
were often judging whether the defendant deserved punishment.186 The concept of scienter, the “vicious will” that must
accompany all crimes, was far more vague then.187 This opened
up trials to many types of defense arguments regarding the
circumstances of the defendant’s life, his character, etc.—arguments that are only rarely or indirectly approachable today.188

only rarely or indirectly
approachable today.
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B. The Demise of the Gilded Age System
and the Rise of Mass Incarceration
Following World War II, the U.S. saw an increase in crime
spanning two generations.195 Starting in the mid-1950s and
continuing into the early 1970s, the nationwide homicide rate
doubled, while the homicide rates of larger cities multiplied
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even more dramatically.196 Detroit’s rate multiplied by eight,
New York’s by six, and most other cities had their rates either
triple or quadruple.197 Although the nationwide crime rate
stabilized at a new higher rate in the 1970s, the crime rate in
larger cities still continued to climb until the modest crime drop
that began in the 1990s.198
The crime rate may have progressed in one direction, but
the reaction to crime did not. At first, between the years 1950
and 1972, the rise in crime was met with increased leniency:
“Chicago’s murder rate tripled between 1950 and 1972, while
Illinois’s imprisonment rate fell [forty-four] percent. In New
York City, murder more than quintupled in those twenty-two
years; the state’s imprisonment rate fell by more the one-third.
Detroit saw murders multiply seven times; imprisonment
in Michigan declined by thirty percent.”199 That seemingly
inexplicable leniency was then replaced by a massive increase
in punishment. In the 1960s, the number of prison-years per
murder fell by half and then, between 1970 and 2000, increased
ninefold.200 During this time, the incarceration rate went from
one the lowest in the world to the absolute highest.201 The
increase in punishment for the African American community
was even more dramatic.202 Many attribute the increase in the
inmate population to mandatory-minimum sentences, threestrikes laws, and the war on drugs, but even if one removes all
the drug convictions from the data, the inmate population would
still have quadrupled.203 The bulk of the increase simply has to
do with the fact that the government is arresting and imprisoning
more people than before.
Why was the crime wave faced first with leniency, and
then unprecedented outrage? The answer involves three major
changes to the criminal justice system that had taken place: (1)
political control shifted from the communities that were most
affected by crime to those that were not; (2) the Warren Court’s
emphasis on protections for criminal defendants caused a “tough
on crime” political backlash; and (3) substantive criminal law
became less open to defenses and more the subject of official
discretion.204

1. Loss of Local Control
In the years following World War II, prosecutors and trial
judges were still elected at the county level, but the majority of
votes coming from within those counties moved from the cities
to the suburbs.
In the 1940, Chicagoans were 70 percent of the population of the Chicago metropolitan area; by 1960 their
share had fallen to 57 percent, by 1980 to 42 percent.
During the same years, Cleveland’s percentage of
its metropolitan area fell from 69 to 49, then to 30.
Detroit’s fell from 68 to 44, then to 28.205
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Suburban voters, for whom crime was not a pressing
concern, outnumbered city voters. Even within the cities, crime
was concentrated to particular neighborhoods, and those in
more affluent and safer neighborhoods outnumbered those in
the crime-ridden ones. Prosecutors and Judges, likewise, now
rely on these suburban voters for their jobs. While law enforcement
focuses its efforts on poorer neighborhoods, it is accountable to
the desires of suburban voters who are distant from the effects
of crime and criminal justice.
This distance explains both the excessive lenience during
the first part of the late-twentieth century crime wave, and the
incredible punitive turn in the second part. When the crime
wave first began, suburban voters were insulated from it and
did not notice or feel the need to respond; further spending on
criminal justice, to them, may have felt like a waste. By the
late 1960s, however, riots in big cities and the Warren Court’s
new protections for criminal defendants were highly politicized;
politicians stirred up the indignation of these voting blocs to
support “tough on crime” initiatives.206 The voters obliged and
were distanced from the costs of doing so. Stuntz describes the
phenomenon as follows:
With respect to crime and criminal punishment,
residents of all neighborhoods, safe and dangerous
alike, have two warring incentives. On the one hand,
they want safe streets on which to go about their business; they want to travel to parks and schools and
stores without fearing for their lives and property. On
the other hand, they are loath to incarcerate their sons
and brothers, neighbors and friends. … Local political
control over criminal justice harnesses both forces
without giving precedence to either.207
With the loss of local political control, we also lost stability
in our response to crime.208 The specifics of the backlash to the
Warren Court and the features of tough on crime legislation
deepened the mass incarceration problem.

2. The Warren Court and Backlash
The Warren Court introduced a number of innovations to
the area of criminal procedure. The Court expanded warrant
requirements and rights to counsel; it gave criminal defendants
protections against police questioning in Miranda;209 and it
applied the exclusionary rule against the states in Mapp.210
Though the motivation behind these rulings was undoubtedly
to make the administration of criminal justice more fair and less
discriminatory, the effect may have been the opposite. Some
argue that these rules have made it more difficult to differentiate
between the innocent and guilty, and may have, on balance,
wound up benefiting the guilty more.211 Sophisticated defendants, chronic recidivists and the wealthy, could navigate their
new rights more deftly than the innocent or the poor.212 On the
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other hand, others argue that by focusing on criminal procedure,
rather than the substance of criminal law, the protections of
the Warren Court were more easily subverted by later Court
rulings and legislatures who could broaden waiver rules and
redefine crimes to escape the new procedural scrutiny; thereby,
endangering the innocent.213
Although there are many differing viewpoints regarding
how correctly these cases were decided, it is generally agreed
that the timing of the Warren Court’s decisions worked against
its aims.214 The Warren Court introduced all these protections
for criminal defendants at a time when the crime rate was
skyrocketing, fueling the rage of politicians and the public
and resulting in the “tough on crime” movement and mass
incarceration.215 Crime and anti-Warren Court rhetoric was
prominently featured in campaigns for President and in the
campaigns for state governorships.216 Though Republican
governors and legislatures led the way, the officials from all
states wanted to appear as punitive as possible.217 And, because
the votes they were vying for were the votes of suburban voters
crying for more punishment, there was no incentive for officials
to argue for leniency. “They were the votes of those for whom
crime was at once frightening and distant, those who read about
open-air drug markets and the latest gang shootings in the morning paper. Neighborhood democracy faded, and was replaced by
a democracy of angry neighbors.”218
Stuntz provides an account of the 1986 legislation that set
the sentencing ratio between crack and powder cocaine, which
serves as a good illustration of the “tough on crime” movement:
“In congressional debates preceding the passage of the
bill, one member proposed a weight/sentencing ratio
of twenty to one; another suggested fifty to one.219 One
hundred to one, the ratio finally enacted, was the highest
anyone proposed. Crack-powder legislation was the
product of an auction, not a political compromise.”220
Without the balanced impulses of locally controlled criminal
justice, legislators, courts, and prosecutors were unchecked
in their drive to punish. The new punitive movement did not
just increase criminal punishment, but changed the nature of
criminal laws.221

3. Substantive Criminal Law Becomes More
Indirect and Less Focused on Intent
In order to dodge the procedural rules put in place by the
Warren Court, state legislatures redefined crimes, specifically
minimizing criminal intent.222 Drug charges as a whole are
often used as indirect ways of punishing others for more violent
offenses that are harder to prove.223 Urban gangs are adept at
intimidating witnesses, which limits prosecutors’ ability to
convict members of violent crimes, resulting in prosecutors
charging gang members with easier-to-prove drug offenses that
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carry hefty penalties.224 “Charge stacking” is another tool for
the prosecutor, whereby they charge an offender with multiple
offenses based on the same conduct, and engage in bargaining
with the offender to reduce the amount of charges, in exchange
for a plea.225 In addition, legislatures have obliged prosecutors
by developing many related series of crimes that survive the
double jeopardy rule.226
At the same time, trial judges and juries have lost much
discretion over sentencing due to mandatory minimum laws,
repeat offender laws, and sentencing guidelines.227 These rules
have not limited prosecutors; in fact, they have contributed
to the power the prosecutor has during plea-bargaining.228
Appellate judges, legislators, and prosecutors matter more
in the current system, and the moral evaluations of trial judges
and juries matter less.229
By the time the modest crime drop of the 1990s began
and crime slowly went off national political radar, the criminal
justice system had been massively transformed from the one we
had in the Gilded Age.
During the Gilded Age, the working class immigrants
had a great amount of control over the system through three
mechanisms: (1) powerful urban political machines, run on
immigrant votes, which elected the prosecutors, judges, and city
council members; (2) jury pools that drew from the very same
working class neighborhoods where crimes occurred; and (3)
the “scienter” element required for all crimes which allowed
juries and lawyers to take into account a wide variety of moral
and legal arguments.230 By the time the Great Migration of
African Americans came about, none of these three mechanisms
was available. No wonder the two migrations resulted in vastly
different treatment of the immigrants.

V. The Shared Values Between
The Two Movements
The two approaches to criminal justice laid out in this
article, the Restorative Justice movement and the Gilded Age
system, pose comprehensive challenges to our current criminal
justice system. Though they developed separately, their
criticisms of the current system and visions for better criminal
justice systems are manifested by their shared values of
communitarianism and flexibility in the administration of
justice. Although Restorative Justice proponents have often
presented their movement as a wholly separate from the criminal
justice systems that have existed for nearly a millennium in
Western states, aspects of Restorative Justice principles are
evident in the modern American system.
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A.	Communitarianism
John Braithwaite posits that, in order for reintegrative
shaming—the goal of Restorative Justice programs—to
work, communitarianism must exist or be supported by the
justice system.231 A communitarian society acknowledges the
interdependencies that exist between people in a community,
fostering mutual respect and trust, and encouraging people to
take responsibility for one another.232 These societies, so central
to the Restorative Justice vision, were exemplified by the urban
centers in the Gilded Age.233 Stuntz describes the Gilded Age
system as follows:
Cops, crime victims, criminals, and jurors who judged
them—these were not wholly distinct communities;
they overlapped, and the overlaps could be large. Rage
at the depredations of criminals was tempered by empathy
for defendants charged with crime: one hesitates before
sending neighbors’ sons to the state penitentiary. In
such a system, those tempted to commit serious crimes
could be reasonably confident that they would get a
fair shake—which probably made the temptation less
powerful. To use more contemporary terminology, the
justice system of the Gilded Age relied heavily on soft
power and social capital to deter crime.234
This is precisely the society advocated for by many
Restorative Justice proponents. The disappearance of this
balanced, communitarian society in the mid-twentieth century
resulted in the excess of punishment we have today.

B.	Flexibility in the Administration of Justice
The Restorative Justice movement places great value
on flexibility in the administration of justice. The needs of the
particular victim and offender are at the center of any Restorative
Justice program; plans for reparation are unique to the situation
and to the specific culpability of each offender.235 Furthermore,
the proceedings are informal, direct verbal communication is
encouraged, and the offense is framed in ways that relate to the
experiences of those involved.236
Again, the Gilded Age system was remarkably in line with
these traits. As opposed to the modern day system, trials were
common and they focused far less on procedure.237 Criminal
intent was open to a wider variety of defenses.238 Substantive
criminal law was still the province of judge-made decisions and
the common law, based on the conflicts between individuals
rather than reflections of a legislature’s policies.239

C.	Gilded Age Success as a Response
to Restorative Justice Critics
The major criticisms of Restorative Justice have centered
on fears that large scale implementation of these programs
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might be excessively oppressive or lenient. On the one hand,
community control may devolve into mob justice, and hounding
of minority groups within those communities. On the other hand,
communities may not enforce the laws, letting favored or powerful members of their communities go free when prosecution
is appropriate.240
When we look to the Gilded Age system, however, these
fears appear to be unfounded. The hallmarks of the system were
its stability in rates of punishment, and its surprisingly fair treatment of suspect classes.241 It is the more systemized, uniform
system we have today that has produced excesses in leniency and
punishment, and disproportionate punishment of minority groups.
Critics also question whether community control is even
possible.242 This criticism stems from Restorative Justice proponents’ own insistence that their mechanisms are drawn directly
from indigenous and pre-modern origins and are wholly separate from the systems that have existed in the West for nearly
a millennium.243 Critics have questioned whether these systems
can be revived in societies were communal relations are not as
strong as those in tribes or small villages.244
Again, the Gilded Age system offers a response, albeit a
measured one, to these criticisms. Although the urban neighborhoods of the industrializing and increasingly heterogeneous
Gilded Age may have been marginally more tightly knit than
neighborhoods today, they were far more like our society than
the societies several centuries earlier before the state takeover
of the criminal justice system.245 Juries drawn from these communities, along with judges and prosecutors, were able exercise
the control necessary to keep both incarceration and crime rates
low.246 Furthermore, major studies of U.S. communities that are
plagued by both crime and incarceration, have found that shame
imposed by their communities has a profound impression on
members who have been convicted of offenses. Moreover, the
stigmatizing nature of the shame created by the conventional
criminal justice system prevents offenders from ever truly
re-entering society.247 Consequently, it appears that our society
would prefer a system more in line with Restorative Principles,
and would also be able to implement it.

VI. Conclusion
In many ways the new Restorative Justice movement can
be seen as responding to certain needs that have gone unfulfilled
since the Gilded Age. Though the two systems have several
differences, the Gilded Age system tested the most controversial
aspects of Restorative Justice—community control and relatively lax procedural protections—and achieved good results.
Restorative Justice theorists have often debated what relationship their programs should have with the criminal justice as
administered by the states; whether they should position their
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movement to complement that system or to outright replace it.248
By examining the Gilded Age system, however, one can see
how certain changes to the conventional criminal justice system
might bring it more in line with Restorative Justice. These
changes may include smaller geographic bases from which to
elect prosecutors and judges and draw jurors; and legislation
that bolsters criminal intent requirements, letting jurors’ and
judges’ moral evaluations play a greater role in determining
guilt or innocence. The connections between these movements,
their mechanisms and principles, should prove useful for
proponents of both approaches in seeking reforms.
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15
See infra Part III(B), Restorative Justice: Controversies.
1
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I include in this group a loose confederation of institutions and
individuals who argue for the reduction in the amount of imprisonment for
various reasons (groups such as the Sentencing Project and Right on Crime,
e.g.), those who argue for the repeal of laws that constrain the discretion
of judges and juries in sentencing, those who argue against the legislative
workings behind the War on Drugs, those who argue for mechanisms such
as Jury Nullification, etc. See generally infra Part IV, Restorative Justice
in the Gilded Age.
17
See infra Part IV(A), Criminal Justice in the Gilded Age.
18
See generally William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal
Justice (2011).
19
See infra Part IV(A), Criminal Justice in the Gilded Age.
20
Id.
21
See generally Umbreit et al., supra note 6, at 526-28 (providing different
samples of restorative justice systems and their methods of enforcement).
22
See Johnstone, supra note 9, at 98 (“Our penal system has traditionally
relied on shame as upon pain to deter criminals. Many traditional penal
sanctions, such as the pillory, the chain gang, and public floggings were
intended to be both shameful and painful.”).
23
See id. (intending for punishment to be both painful and shameful);
see also John Braithwaite, Crime, shame and reintegration 59-60 (1989)
(surveying the history and motivations of the systematic “uncoupling” of
shame and punishment).
24
See, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 23, at 102 (contrasting shaming
that becomes stigmatizing and shaming that is followed by reintegration); Johnstone, supra note 9, at 73-75, 83 (describing how stigmatizing
shaming can make criminal life attractive, whereas reintegrating shaming
requires acceptance of wrongdoing); Cayley, supra note 13, at 273-76
(commenting on Braithwaite’s analysis of stigmatizing and reintegrating
shaming).
25
See Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and
Justice 33-40 (1990) (evaluating the effects of shaming through a description of an offender’s experience before his crime and through prison).
26
See id. It is important to note that Reintegrative Shaming is not
accepted by all Restorative Justice proponents due to the risk it may be
excessively oppressive and in violation of human rights. See also Tony
F. Marshall, Restorative Justice: An Overview 30, available at http://
library.npia.police.uk/docs/homisc/occ-resjus.pdf.
27
I will refer to the current system of criminal justice, and its attendant
legal and political structure, as the ‘convention criminal justice system.’
Many Restorative Justice scholars refer to this system as ‘retributive
justice,’ though, strictly speaking, it has both retributive and utilitarian
philosophical underpinnings. Others refer to it as ‘traditional justice’
though that would not serve this Article well, as I am comparing this
system with that of an earlier era.
28
See Braithwaite, supra note 34, at 102 (relating the isolation of stigmatizing shaming to an attraction to a criminal lifestyle); see also Johnstone,
supra note 9, at 76 (finding that stigmatizing an offender can often brand
them as a deviant, leading to a further fall into the criminal subculture).
29
John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized:
Realistic or Utopian, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1727, 1738 (1999) [hereinafter
Braithwaite, Future].
30
See Braithwaite, supra note 23, at 55 (dispelling the notion that
labeling someone, as a deviant or criminal, serves as a sanction that
drives people away from the criminal life).
31
See id. at 102 (describing how criminal life can become more attractive
as a result of stigmatizing shaming).
32
See Id. at 103 (describing the consequence of systematically denying
economic opportunities to a group of individuals, which may foster
criminal subcultures).
33
Cayley, supra note 13, at 236.
16
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See Braithwaite, Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, supra note 9,
at 68 (comparing the crime-instigating effects of stigma with the crimereduction effects of a proposed rehabilitative program).
35
See generally Zehr, supra note 25, at 73-74 (concluding that fixing
blame is central to our understanding of justice).
36
See Johnstone, supra note 9, at 81 (explaining how the abstract and
archaic presentation of charges does not relate the human consequences of
an offender’s actions); see also Zehr, supra note 25, at 72 (describing how
the presentation of charges forces both offender and victim to “speak the
language of the system”); see also Hon. Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes From
It”: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N. M. L. Rev. 175, 182 (1994) (pointing
out that the term “guilt” in Navajo law is meaningless because it focuses
too much on inflicting retribution, instead of healing and integration).
37
See Johnstone, supra note 9, at 81 (“The passive, non-participatory role
of the offender in trial process [ ] ensures that formal criminal justice does
little to bring home to offenders the reality of the harm they have caused.”).
38
Braithwaite: Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, supra note 8, at 47
(citing Sykes and Matza (1957)).
39
See Johnstone, supra note 9, at 81 (discussing how offenders often shut
out the human consequences of their crimes).
40
See id. at 99 (“[W]e need shame. Attempts to control criminal
behaviour through coercion and violence simply provoke counterviolence.”).
41
See id. at 106 (“Shame protects that which is private from public
intrusion, thereby allowing certain valuable activities and relationships
to flourish while maintaining our essential sociality.”).
42
Id.
43
Id. (advocating Schneider’s argument that shaming is vital to our
“interdependency and mutual involvement”).
44
See generally Braithwaite, supra note 24, at 54-57 (presenting reintegrative shaming as an alternative to stigmatizing shaming. Braithwaite uses
a family model to show how an authority can shame an offender while still
maintaining a sense of respect for the offender, much like a parent scolds
a child without disassociating him or her from the family).
45
Id. at 1.
46
Id.
47
See Umbreit et al., supra note 6, at 519, 523-26 (providing examples
and explanations of different restorative justice approaches).
48
See id. at 523-525.
49
See Johnstone, supra note 9, at 114 (“[I]t seems prudent to consider
the minimal necessary boundary of community as that limited to the parties
with a direct stake in (need and responsibility in the specific conflict.”).
50
See id. at 126-129 (finding that the relevant community is “brought in”
by the nature of the crime). All Restorative Justice proponents do not share
this view. Some feel that there must be a static geographic community
that is designated for the resolution of all crimes, while others feel that
the community should be expanded or contracted depending on the type
of crime: family members for offenses within a family on the smaller side
and representatives of entire nationalities for violations of human rights or
war crimes on the much larger side. Id.
51
See id. at 125 (discussing the importance of community involvement,
recognizing it as the most powerful entity to influence the offender).
52
See id. at 38 (concluding that the community, not the lawyer, will use
its knowledge of the offender to expose the “frailty” of their excuses).
53
See supra note 51 (stating that the crime determines which members
of the community will be involved in the proceeding).
54
Id.
55
See Umbreit et al., supra note 6, at 29-30, 58 (describing the role of the
mediator).
56
See Johnstone, supra note 9, at 122 (discussing how such a process can
maximize the parties “ownership of the issue”).
57
See id. at 27 (contrasting “principled sentencing,” which seeks to
punish proportionately to the severity or degree of blameworthiness).
34
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See id. (conceding that democratic creativity can result in “idiosyncratic remedies”).
59
See generally Zehr, supra note 25, at 211-214 (listing differences
between the characteristics of the current justice system and that of an ideal
restorative justice system).
60
See id.
61
See generally Johnstone, supra note 9, at 80-87 (providing a broad
overview of the phases of restorative justice).
62
See id. at 80.
63
See Braithwaite, Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, supra note 8,
at 47 (listing types of exculpatory techniques).
64
See Johnstone, supra note 9, at 83 (distinguishing the conventional
penal process which employs a pyramidal structure of communication,
whereas the Restorative Justice utilizes a horizontal structure of communication, stemming from the offender’s peers and not an authority figure
of the state).
65
See id. (using an example of an offender who stole a victim’s car,
the victim scolded the offender by emphasizing the consequences of his
actions, rather than scolding the offender’s character).
66
See Braithwaite, Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, supra note 8, at
20 (“Empowerment of victims to define the restoration that matters to them
is a keystone of a restorative justice philosophy.”).
67
See id. at 23-24 (discussing the honoring of obligations to victims).
68
See id. at 3 (providing examples of decertification ceremonies in
pre-modern cultures).
69
William Bradshaw & David Roseborough, Restorative Justice
Dialogue: The Impact of Mediation and Conferencing on Juvenile
Recidivism, 69 Fed. Probation, 15, 18 (2005).
70
See Sarah Nelson & Linda Wagner, Evaluation of the Restorative
Justice Program 13 (2001) (finding that juveniles who met with victims
had an 80.8% decrease in number of offenses, whereas those who didn’t
meet with victims only had a 65.3% decrease in number of offenses. Those
who did not participate only had a 32.2% decrease in number of offenses);
see also Jane Wynne & Imogen Brown, Can Mediation Cut Reoffending?,
45 Probation J. 21, 24-25 (1998) (finding in two separate studies that
68% and 58%, respectively, of offenders in a mediation program did not
have repeat convictions in two years); Umbreit et al., supra note 7, at 545
(examining several studies of restorative justice programs and finding that
they all had significant drops in subsequent offenses).
71
See, e.g., Jennifer L. Kerrigan, “It’s Not World Peace, but. . .”
Restorative Justice: Analysis of Recidivism Rates in Campbell Law
School’s Juvenile Justice Project, 30 Campbell L. Rev. 339, 357 (2007)
(noting a 16-24% drop in recidivism rates for juvenile offenders); Justice
Reduces Crime by 27%, Sheffield Telegraph, July 1, 2008, http://
www.sheffieldtelegraph.co.uk/headlines/Report-shows-restorativejustice-reduces.4238005.jp.; William R. Nugent et al., Participation in
Victim-Offender Mediation and the Prevalence and Severity of Subsequent
Delinquent Behavior: A Meta-Analysis, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 137, 156 (2003)
(noting studies that suggest that re-offense rates are 33% lower for victimoffender mediation program participants); Hon. T. Bennett Burkemper et
al., Restorative Justice in Missouri’s Juvenile System, 63 J. Mo. B. 128, 129
(2007) (noting that after analyzing sixty-three programs that participants in
the programs were “one-third less likely” to become repeat offenders); See
also Christopher D. Lee, They All Laughed at Christopher Columbus When
He Said the World Was Round: The Not-So-Radical and Reasonable Need
for A Restorative Justice Model Statute, 30 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 523,
534 (2011) (stating that recidivism rates drop significantly in restorative
justice models).
72
See Umbreit et al., supra note 6, at 545.
73
See Paul McCold, Ph. D. & Benjamin Wachtel, Restorative Policing
Experiment: The Bethlehem Pennsylvania Police Family Group
Conferencing Project 3-4, 51 (1998), http://www.iirp.edu/pdf/BPD.pdf
58
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(presenting studies that showed offenders in conflict mediation programs
had a significantly lower arrest rate 12 months after the programs);
see also Umbreit et al., supra note 6, at 545-46 (finding a 32% lower
re-offense rate amongst participants of a family mediation program); see
generally Claudia Fercello & Mark Umbreit, Client Evaluation of Family
Group Conferencing In 12 Sites in 1st Judicial District of Minnesota 7-9,
11 (1998), available at http://2ssw.che.edu/rjp/Resources/Documents/
ferumb98.pdf. (showing a high acceptance and overall attitude change by
offenders who participated in family mediation programs).
74
See McCold & Wachtel, supra note 73, at 3-4, 51 (focusing on a
study that showed offender’s positive acceptance of Restorative Justice
programs).
75
See Braithwaite, Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, supra note 8, at
27-29 (citing a study conducted in Washington, D.C. in which offenders
were selected randomly for victim-offender mediation and the reoffender
rate was “significantly lower”).
76
See id. at 28-29.
77
See Zehr, supra note 25, at 211-214 (including “focus on offender,
victim ignored” as a characteristic of the current justice system in a list of
differences between the current system and a restorative justice system);
see also Cayley, supra note 13, at 230–31 (discussing the offender-victim
relationship).
78
See Zehr, supra note 25, at 182 (classifying crime, at its core,
as a violation by one person of another person).
79
See Johnstone, supra note 9, at 55-57 (discussing the inadequacies
of the criminal justice system in terms of its effects on victims).
80
See Zehr, supra note 25, at 19-22 (using the example of a woman
assaulted by a masked man with a knife to outline the three phases).
81
See id. at 20 (including feelings of confusion, helplessness, and terror).
82
See generally id. at 30 (discussing how the justice process should be
victim-centered rather than offender-centered, allowing the victim to be
more involved with decisions to be made in the case).
83
See id. at 20 (defining the recoil phase as a wave of overwhelming
feelings that a victim suffers post-incident, including, inter alia, depression, rage, and suspicion of strangers).
84
Compare Johnstone, supra note 9, at 64 (describing how the mediation
process provides meaningful restitution for the victim) with Zehr, supra
note 25, at 30-32 (noting how the current system puts victims through a
“second victimization,” where victims suffer by being removed from the
focus of the process).
85
See Johnstone, supra note 9, at 56 (rationalizing the use of punitive
punishment rather than mere compensation, which would undermine the
severity of the wrong).
86
See id. at 57 (discussing various examples of how the punitive system
makes reparation and reconciliation less likely).
87
See id.
88
See generally Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 The Brit. J. of
Criminology, 1, 1-15 (1977).
89
Id.
90
See Johnstone, supra note 9, at 120.
91
See generally Braithwaite, supra note 23, 84-94 (concluding that most
western societies turn to individualism rather than communitarianism).
92
See Johnstone, supra note 9, at 121 (citing Robert A. Baruch Bush
& Joseph P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict
Through Empowerment and Mediation 84-85 (Jeffrey Z. Rubin ed. 1994)).
93
Cayley, supra note 13, at 168.
94
See Bush & Folger, supra note 92, at 242.
95
Id.
96
See Marshall, supra note 26, at 8 (recognizing the “greater emphasis
on individual privacy and autonomy,” and social divides that inevitably
limits community involvement).
97
See id.
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See id. (stating that if Restorative Justice is to be community-centered,
there must be a community).
99
See Braithwaite, Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, supra note 9,
at 4 (outlining the foundation of Restorative Justice, which balances less
punitive remedies and victim empowerment).
100
See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 9, at 30-35 (providing an overview
of many ancient cultures who used forms of restorative justice); Cayley,
supra note 14, at 167 (giving an example of Restorative Justice in
pre-modern Europe).
101
See Johnstone, supra note 9, at 30 (finding that the task of administering criminal justice became a symbol of the growing power of the
centralized state, leading to the processes of apprehending and punishing
offenders).
102
See e.g., id. at 34.
103
See id. at 30-35 (discussing the 1960s’ revival of restorative justice
traditions in North America, New Zealand, Australia, and elsewhere).
104
See Marshall, supra note 26, at 7.
105
Seven states, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Montana, Oregon, and
Tennessee, have adopted comprehensive statutory guidelines combining
the use of restorative justice programs with standard measures in an order
to combat their own recidivism rates. Another sixteen states provide clear
statutory authority for restorative programs but with less detail than the
seven previously mentioned. Yet another seven states allow for restorative
justice programs to complement, but not replace, traditional methods.
See Umbreit et al., supra note 6, at 551-54.
106
See id. at 552 (stressing restorative justice’s focus on the strengths
of the individual as the cornerstone of the theory).
107
Johnstone, supra note 9, at 31.
108
See id. (discussing the increasingly problematic occurrences of private
vengeance in early developing societies).
109
See id. at 32 (“‘An offender could buy back the peace he had injured
by a system of fines’” to the offended party and to the king).
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
See id. at 33 (challenging the assumption that violence was the
natural response to a perceived wrong and that compensation was already
an option).
113
See id. (claiming that “[w]ronged parties were usually expected to
accept compensation if the appropriate amount was offered.”).
114
See id. at 35-39.
115
See id. at 33 (seeking reconciliation between offender and victim,
instead of placing blame on and punishing the offender).
116
Yazzie, supra note 36, at 182-189 (1994) (describing peace-making
techniques of Navajo tribes).
117
Id. at 184 (finding that Navajo tribes believed coercion should be
avoided because people react differently when being forced to act).
118
See Braithwaite, Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, supra note 8, at
8 (documenting the shortcomings of the current criminal justice system).
119
See id.
120
See generally Kathleen Daly, Restorative justice: the real story, 4
Punishment and Soc’y 55 (2002), available at: http://www98.griffith.edu.
au/dspace/handle/10072/6547.
121
See Johnstone, supra note 9, at 40 (acknowledging Daly’s myth argument; however, criticizing its complete dismissal of accurate historical
truths).
122
See e.g., Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and
Revival of American Community (2000). Putnam’s work represents a new
classic in the field, illustrating the reduction in all forms of social capital
and interaction between people in society since the mid-twentieth century.
The work represents a small part of the sociological study that has been
noting the decline in communitarianism since the rise of industrialization.
See id.
98
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See Braithwaite, Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, supra note 8, at
84 (discussing the difficulties of applying Restorative Justice programs to
modern day communities).
124
See id. at 12-14 (maintaining that Restorative Justice is more effective
in communities that are more interdependent).
125
John Braithwaite, Shame and Modernity, 33(1) The British J. of
Criminology 1, 13 (1993).
126
See Johnstone, supra note 9, at 42 (pointing out that cutting oneself off
from disapproval in a modern community is often the easier option).
127
See id. (identifying family members outside of the nuclear family, in
different geographic locations that may attend the family group conference). Others are skeptical to varying degrees regarding how true this
assertion is. This debate continues in the scholarship. Id.
128
See, e.g., Braithwaite, Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, supra note
8, at 65 (arguing that conferences will fail if they overly shame or threaten
the offender).
129
See generally James Whitman, What Is Wrong With Inflicting Shame
Sanctions?, 107 Yale L. J. 1055 (1998) (discussing the possible shortcomings of a system that utilizes shaming); see also Johnstone, supra note 10,
at 107-08 (discussing Whitman’s article and analyzing possible cruelties
associated with shaming).
130
See Cayley, supra note 13, at 199.
131
See id. at 207 (discussing difficulties in defining a community); see also
Johnstone, supra note 10, at 25 (arguing that communities are hierarchal
social arrangements).
132
See Umbreit et al., supra note 6, at 25 (discussing how communities
have the potential to further weaken socially-weak parties).
133
See Johnstone, supra note 9, at 104 (providing an example where
the victim’s son, present as a supporter, was familiar with the offenders,
thereby making the experience even more humiliating and traumatic).
134
See id.
135
See Braithwaite, Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, supra note 8,
at 75 (acknowledging the “bureaucratic” realities of the criminal justice
system).
136
But see Umbreit et al., supra note 6, at 521 (arguing that the safeguards
should still be applied to restorative justice programs).
137
See id. at 517 (distinguishing the Restorative Justice program’s objective to repair harm, with the criminal justice system’s objective to punish).
138
Cf. Braithwaite, Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, supra note 9,
at 89 (providing the finding of multiple studies that found victims to be
considerably less punitive than one might think).
139
See id. at 50 (“If a group of citizens cannot agree in an undominated
conference that an act of obscenity is wrong, then the obscenity should not
be a crime; and the conference will fail in controlling obscenity.”).
140
See id. (stating that conduct that is “unambiguously wrong to most
citizens attending a conference,” will obviously constitute a crime).
141
Johnstone, supra note 9, at 46-47 (explaining that while some prohibitions are unpopular among the majority, such prohibitions are necessary
for the overall protection of the community, for example smoking in public
places).
142
See supra notes 139-42.
143
See Umbreit et al., supra note 6, at 542 (mentioning fears that broad
implementation of restorative justice may sanction those who may not
otherwise be sanctioned).
144
See, e.g., Braithwaite, Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, supra note
8, at 27 (reporting the results of six restitution studies , finding significant
reductions in recidivism rates).
145
See Stuntz, supra note 18, at 15-16.
146
See id. at 16-18 (describing the two major, urban crime waves that
accompanied mass migration).
147
See id. at 16 (recording a sharp increase in the murder rate that
coincided with African-American migration).
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See id. at 23.
See id. (passing the 18th Amendment, which banned the manufacture
and sale of alcohol, and the Immigration Act of 1924, which banned mass
immigration in the U.S.).
150
See id.
151
See id. at 173. See generally David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and
Equal Protection, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1283 (1993) (providing a constitutional
overview of the relationship between race and drugs—crack cocaine was
more commonly associated with African Americans, despite the fact that
they represent only a small minority of crack users).
152
See Stuntz, supra note 18, at 15-16 (stating that black voters became
centerpieces to urban elections as they moved to northern cities).
153
See id. at 17-22 (comparing the European immigration with the African
movement to the North).
154
See id. at 131 (concluding that policing, criminal litigation, and criminal
punishment were less discriminatory and vastly more lenient than today).
155
Id. at 132.
156
Id. at 132-133.
157
Id. (indicating that New York’s crime drop in the 1990s was more
pronounced than these other cities).
158
See id. (finding the homicide rate coincided with a large crime wave).
159
See id. at 134 (showing prison rates which were not only much lower
than current data, but also grew and shrank very little).
160
Id. at 134-135.
161
Id.
162
See id. at 133 (showing similar rates in Chicago, Boston, and
Philadelphia).
163
See id. at 134.
164
See id. (showing a rapid drop and then steady increase in imprisonment
in New York between 1950 and 2000).
165
See Roger Lane, Murder in America: A History 334 (1997) (explaining the unpopularity and effectiveness of “battered woman’s syndrome”).
Today, defense lawyers may argue that the defendant suffered from
“battered woman’s syndrome” to explain to juries why an abused person
in a relationship may resort to killing even when it might appear to an
onlooker that calling the police would have been the more reasonable
course of action. Id.
166
Stuntz, supra note 18, at 136.
167
See id. (stating that women accomplished the same legal results seventy
years before the transformation of the women’s movement).
168
See Lane, supra note 165, at 197-199 (finding that in Chicago and
Philadelphia, blacks who killed whites got the same verdicts and sentences
as whites who killed blacks); see generally Randolph Roth, American
Homicide (2009).
169
Stuntz, supra note 18, at 137 (finding that a large amount of acquittals
were won by poor and lower class defendants, often using generic selfdefense claims) (citing Jeffrey S. Adler, First in Crime, Deepest in Dirt:
Homicide in Chicago, 1875-1920 116 (2006)).
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Stuntz, supra note 18, at 72.
173
See id. at 89 (discussing the rise of the urban police forces, the first
being in New York City in 1845).
174
See id. at 88 (describing the move by prosecutors to answer voter’s
needs, rather than the state’s).
175
See Samuel Walker, Popular Justice: A History of American
Criminal Justice 44-45 (1980) (finding that instruments, like the
Commentaries, were essential in a society where most lawyers were trained
by apprenticeship).
176
See Stuntz, supra note 18, at 88 (describing the general movement
away from piecework prosecutors).
148
149
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See id. at 90 (explaining how city police forces replaced the previously
inadequate urban forces).
178
Id. at 91.
179
Id. at 91.
180
See id. at 83.
181
Judicial Processing of Defendants, Sourcebook of Crim. Just. Stats.,
§ 5.57 (2006) available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/
section5.pdf.
182
Stuntz, supra note 18, at 139 (citing statistics from Alameda County,
California).
183
See id. (describing Gilded Age procedural rules as less elaborate than
those of current justice systems).
184
Id.
185
See generally George Fisher, The jury’s rise as lie detector, 107 Yale
L. J. 575 (1997)
(providing a detailed perspective of the jury’s role as not only a fact finder,
but in determining the truth of the matter).
186
See Stuntz, supra note 18, at 140-41 (discussing the juror’s role).
187
See id. (introducing “vicious will” or “evil meaning mind” as the
obstacle of intent that prosecutors had to prove).
188
See id. at 139 (arguing that defenses used to be broader and less clearly
defined).
189
Id. at 7.
190
See M. Craig Brown and Barbara D. Warner, Immigrants, Urban
Politics, and Policing in 1900, 57(3) Am. Soc. Rev. 293, 301-02 (1992)
(using studies of Pittsburgh and Cincinnati to illustrate the political clout
of immigrant populations).
191
See Stuntz, supra note 18, at 30 (describing how locally selected juries
decided a large fraction of serious criminal cases).
192
See id. at 6 (listing four major changes that affected political populations: (1) crime grew more concentrated in cities; (2) suburban populations
“mushroomed”; (3) jury trials became rarer; and (4) more power over criminal proceedings fell in the hands of legislators and judicial administrators).
193
See id. at 143 (showing differences in murder rates between cities like
Atlanta, Houston, Boston, and Chicago).
194
See id. (describing differences in the level of seriousness afforded to
criminal investigations between whites and blacks).
195
See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports between
the years 1950 and 1991, available at http://www.bpl.org/online/govdocs/
uniform_crime_reports.html.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Stuntz, supra note 18, at 5.
200
Id. at 232.
201
See One in 100, supra note 3, at 35 (showing the inmate population
rise to 2,245,189 in 2005, making the U.S. the country with the highest
incarceration rate).
202
See id. at 3 (finding the incarceration rates for African Americans
“especially startling”).
203
See id. (discussing the effects of certain policy measures, like the
“three strikes rule” on incarceration); see also Stuntz, supra note 18, at 47
(maintaining that drugs and the “three-strikes rule” were major factors in
the “explosion” in incarceration rates among African Americans).
204
See Stuntz, supra note 18, at 239-43 (giving an overview of the changes
that affected the criminal justice system over the twentieth century).
205
Id. at 192.
206
See infra section IV(B)(ii); See generally Sasha Abramsky, American
Furies: Crime, Punishment, and Vengeance in the Age of Mass
Imprisonment (2007) (offering a perspective on the relationship between
punishment and vengeance in the twentieth century).
207
Stuntz, supra note 18, at 36.
177
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See id. at 36 (arguing that political control helps harness and balance
the desire for justice with the hesitancy to incarcerate neighbors).
209
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498 (1966) (requiring police
officers to inform arrestees of specific rights prior to the initiation of
custodial interrogation).
210
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (allowing courts to
exclude evidence that came as a result of an illegal search or seizure).
211
See generally Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J.
of Crim. L. and Criminology 621 (1996) (analyzing the pitfalls of administering Miranda warnings through various empirical studies).
212
See, e.g., at 684 (mentioning that ex-convicts may be more aware of
deceptive ploys to fool police).
213
See id. at 622 (discussing the aftermath, public reaction, and legislative
responses to the Miranda ruling).
214
See id. at 622-23 (finding that Supreme Court decisions since Miranda
have chipped away at its effectiveness. Also, discussing the executive
response to Miranda, which went as far as to call the decision “illegitimate”).
215
But see One in 100, supra note 3, at 17 (noting that even though politicians are wary of advocating for diverse punishment strategies, they are
afraid of appearing “soft” on crime).
216
See Stuntz, supra note 18, at 236-241 (providing an overview of the
political backlash following several criminal justice decisions).
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